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A Comparison Between U.S. and E.U.
Antitrust Treatment of Tying Claims
Against Microsoft: When Should the
Bundling of Computer Software Be
Permitted?
James F. Ponsoldt* & Christopher D. David**
Most consumers of computer equipment likely would support the
continued practice by computer marketers of including various software
with an operating system at no apparent additional price. The economies
applicable when the dominant system manufacturer-Microsoft, for
example-bundles Windows XP together with its media player and
messenger services, save many consumers time and money.
Such bundling practices, however, may also have the effect of making
it difficult for smaller software producers to enter and compete in those
ancillary software markets and, ultimately, provide additional innovation.
As innovation markets expand worldwide, the question of whether antitrust
regulators should permit or forbid a dominant firm in technology markets to
bundle several products has become increasingly critical and divisive.
In recognition of the benefit of harmonizing competition policies
worldwide, the Justice Department's chief antitrust enforcer, H. Hewitt
Pate, in 2005 listed "pursuing international convergence in cartel
enforcement" and "establishing an approach to dealing with unilateral
conduct that does not chill innovation" as two of the three main goals for
U.S. antitrust enforcement.1
The divergent treatment of software bundling by Microsoft, as
suggested above, in the United States2 and European Union, 3 respectively,
* Joseph Henry Lumpkin Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
** Member of the Georgia and Tennessee Bars.
See CCH Trade Reg. Reports No. 885, Apr. 6, 2005, at 2.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd in
part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Microsoft III], discussed infra at notes 104-
28. and accompanying text. In general, the D.C. Circuit found that Microsoft's tying
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:421 (2007)
has become Exhibit A in support of the relevance of Mr. Pate's goals.
Much more recently, in fact, the Korean Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC")
has entered the debate on the side of the European Union.4 On December 7,
2005, the KFTC found Microsoft's bundling practices to be in violation of
Korea's Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act.5
In response to that decision, Bruce McDonald, the antitrust division's
deputy assistant attorney general, made clear that the Justice Department
agrees with Microsoft and the position of the D.C. Circuit, described below,
and fundamentally rejects condemnation of software bundling by
Microsoft:
We had previously consulted with the [Korean Fair Trade]
Commission on its Microsoft case and encouraged the Commission
to develop a balanced resolution that addressed its concerns without
imposing unnecessary restrictions. Sound antitrust policy should
protect competition, not competitors, and must avoid chilling
innovation and competition even by 'dominant' companies.
Furthermore, we believe that regulators should avoid substituting
their judgment for the market's by determining what products are
made available to consumers.6
arrangements were not unlawful.
3 See Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, (unreported, Mar. 24,
2004) (CEC), available at http://europa.eu.int/comrn/competition/antitrust/cases/
decisions/37792/en.pdf, discussed infra at notes 148-72 and accompanying text. In the
context of this litigation, Microsoft announced on January 25, 2006 that:
[Ilt will license all the Windows operating system software source code for the
technologies covered by a March 2004 decision of the European Commission
[("E.C.")] in order to address E.C. concerns that it is not complying with the
remedies imposed on the company. On March 24, 2004, the E.C. concluded that
Microsoft broke European Union competition law by leveraging its near monopoly
in the market for PC operating systems onto the markets for work group server
operating systems and for media players.
CCH Trade Reg. Reports No. 928 at 5-6 (Feb. 1, 2006).
According to a December 22, 2005, E.C. Statement of Objections, "Microsoft has failed to
disclose complete and accurate interface documentation to allow non-Microsoft workgroup
servers to achieve full interoperability with Windows PCs and servers, despite its obligation
to do so under the terms of the E.C.'s March 2004 decision that Microsoft was abusing its
dominant market position." CCH Trade Reg. Reports No. 928 at 5-6 (Feb. 1, 2006).
4 See CCH Trade Reg. Reports No. 921, Dec. 14, 2005, at 2-3.
5 Id. "The KFTC contended that [Microsoft] tied its media player and messenger
products to its Windows operating system. Microsoft was ordered to pay approximately 33
billion (approximately $31 million) and to unbundle its media player and messenger
products from its windows operating system." Id.
6 Id.
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Thus, while the policy of the United States is one of comparative
deference to efficiencies created by dominant firm behavior,7 the European
Union and KFTC continue to believe that they cannot protect competition
without protecting competitors, that competitive markets will be more
innovative in the longer term, and that regulators continue to have a role in
policing the markets.
This article will analyze the recent U.S. and E.U. judicial approaches
to tying charges which stem from software bundling. Part II reviews U.S.
tying jurisprudence both generally and as applied to software bundling.
Part III outlines the D.C. Circuit's approach to Microsoft's
Windows/Internet Explorer bundle. Part IV briefly covers tying
jurisprudence in the European Union. Part V describes the European
Commission's ("E.C.") analysis of Microsoft's Window/Windows Media
Player bundle. By comparing the two approaches, Part VI shows that
neither approach is ideal: although the U.S. approach offers too little
guidance to software manufacturers seeking to avoid liability and unduly
discounts potential losses in innovation from excluded competitors, the
E.U. approach stifles dominant software firm innovation and efficiency
because the approach is too rigid and formalistic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tying, or a tie-in, ordinarily involves the practice of conditioning the
sale of one product (the tying good) on the sale of another (the tied good).
Tying has been one of the most direct forms of competitive restraint by
firms with some degree of market power. By requiring a consumer to
purchase one good or service in connection with another more desired
product, a seller leverages demand for its tying product against the
consumer. The seller thus reduces consumer autonomy and, most pertinent
from an antitrust analysis, restrains competition in the market for the tied
product.8
7 This deference was reflected most recently in the Supreme Court's decision in Verizon
Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), in which Justice
Scalia wrote, "The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market
system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what
attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation
and economic growth." Id. at 407.
8 See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1218 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1977). The Court in Ungar stated:
[C]oercion is implicit-both logically and linguistically-in the concept of
leverage upon which the illegality of tying is premised: The seller with market
power in one market uses that power as a 'lever' to force acceptance of his product
in another market. If the product in the second market would be accepted any
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:421 (2007)
To impose an effective tying arrangement, the seller must command a
strong share of the tying good's market or some other source of leveraging
power.9 By capitalizing on this market power and forcing consumers to
purchase the tied product, the seller reduces legitimate competition and
gains a competitive advantage in the tied product's market. Moreover,
consumers often are forced to purchase a tied product which may be inferior
to fill their demand for the tying product-a superior product likely would
need no help from a coercive tying arrangement; it can sell itself. Tying
interferes with competition in all these ways, and is, therefore, traditionally
illegal per se when applied by a seller with leveraging power in the tying
product. It could be practically reasoned, of course, that whenever a seller
successfully forces a tie-in, buyers must perceive that such leveraging
power exists. °
Bundling products, however, also can create efficiencies. Some
economists view the practice of bundling products in a single transaction-
a variant of tying-with an increasingly tolerant eye, even when one
product enjoys market dominance. One sector in which bundling is
increasingly popular is the software industry. Twin forces of innovation-
which creates new product functions-and integration-which either
combines existing product functions or couples existing to new functions-
induce software manufacturers to engage in what looks very much like
traditional, per se illegal tying. Often, these manufacturers can present
compelling cost-saving arguments when faced with a tying accusation.
Although some jurisdictions sympathetically accept these efficiency
arguments without question, others are decidedly more reticent. Such a
disparity exists between U.S. antitrust and E.U. competition law and is
evidenced by recent tying claims brought against the Microsoft
Corporation. 1
While the U.S. courts accommodated Microsoft and created a new rule
way, because of its own merit, then, of course, no leverage is involved.
Id.
9 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992)
(requiring appreciable economic power in the tying good), specific holding overruled by
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006) (holding that
a patented product does not, by virtue of the patent, presumptively provides leveraging
power).
10 See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
" In the United States, Microsoft ran afoul of the Department of Justice by bundling
Intemet Explorer with its Windows operating system. See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). In the European Union, Microsoft was penalized for bundling Windows Media
Player with Windows operating system. See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, (COMP/C-
3/37.792) (unreported, Mar. 24, 2004) (CEC), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
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for bundling software platforms and applications, the European Union
adopted a more traditional approach. The D.C. Circuit opted to analyze
software operating system tying under a flexible, if not amorphous, rule of
reason.' 2 The E.C., however, pursued Microsoft more vigorously on the
issue of tying and applied a qualified Rer se rule of illegality against
Microsoft's software bundling practices. Both U.S. and E.U. rules on
software tying will, of course, affect the way in which software
manufacturers distribute and sell within these jurisdictions.
II. THE LAW OF TYING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Tying Jurisprudence Generally
Chiefly, tying can be challenged under either section 1 of the Sherman
Act 14 or section 3 of the Clayton Act.1 5 Although these statutes differ in
theory and details, they produce a similar standard for analysis of tying.
1 6
While the Sherman Act applies to both tied goods and services, 17 the
Clayton Act's commodity requirement restricts it only to goods.
1 8
Likewise, the Sherman Act enjoys a broader jurisdictional reach than the
Clayton Act. 19 Nonetheless, the test for the legality of tying under either act
is functionally the same.
20
12 See Microsoft 11, 253 F.3d 34.
13 See Microsoft Corp., (COMP/C-3/37.792).
14 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
" 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000).
16 See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 521 (1969)
(interpreting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)) ("Northern Pacific, in
effect, applied the same standards to tying arrangements under the Sherman Act as under the
Clayton Act, on the theory that the anticompetitive effect of a tie-in was such as to make the
difference in language in the two statutes immaterial.").
17 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 13 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (holding that tying
transportation services to lease of real property outside scope of Clayton Act, though
reachable under Sherman Act); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (holding that a tie-in of franchise to franchisee's purchasing
exclusively from franchisor violated § 1 of the Sherman Act ).
18 See Clayton Act. § 3 (prohibiting certain contracts for sale of "goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities"); 9 PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1700e, at 10 (2d ed. 2000) (noting the lack of importance of
§ 3's limitations because § 3 "applies only to 'commodities' for resale within the United
States").
19 See United States v. Am. Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975) (holding that
the Clayton Act has only in-commerce jurisdiction while the Sherman Act has affecting-
commerce jurisdiction, or the entirety of the Commerce Clause).
20 Fortner Enters., Inc., 394 U.S. at 521 (interpreting N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. 1)
("Northern Pacific, in effect, applied the same standards to tying arrangements under the
Sherman Act as under the Clayton Act, on the theory that the anticompetitive effect of a tie-
in was such as to make the difference in language in the two statutes immaterial.").
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The requirements for per se illegal tying violations are four-fold: first,
two separate products must exist; second, the defendant directly or
practically must condition the sale of the tying product on the purchase of
the tied product; third, the defendant must enjoy leveraging power in the
tying product's market; and fourth, the practice of tying must foreclose a
substantial amount of competition in the tied product's market.21
Frequently, contentious issues arise in analyzing the first prong, which
requires proof of separate products: "the concept of product integration (or
its converse, product 'separateness') is the linchpin of the antitrust
jurisprudence on tying arrangements. That question is also one of great
economic subtlety, for it implicates fundamental theoretical questions of
consumer demand and consumer welfare ....
To determine whether two items are separate products or one
integrated product, and therefore whether there exists a tying relationship in
the first place, the Supreme Court announced a "consumer demand" test in
Jefferson Parish.23 First, the Court held that "the answer to the question
whether one or two products are involved" does not turn "on the functional
relation between them .... Thus, items that are complementary, even to
the point that "one ... is useless without the other" do not necessarily
comprise a single product.25
Next, the Court stated that a determination of separate or integrated
products hinges "on whether the arrangement may have the type of
competitive consequences addressed by the rule" proscribing tying. 6
Therefore, "no tying arrangement can exist unless there is a sufficient
demand for the purchase of [the tied product] separate from [the tying
product] to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer
[the tied product] separately from [the tying product] ...,27 As stated in
Jefferson Parish, the operative focus in a separate product inquiry is
consumer demand for the tied product.28  Of course, a finding that two
separate products are involved, as resulted in Jefferson Parish, is merely a
prerequisite under traditional tying law to the dispositive question of
whether the defendant has leveraging power in the tying product market.
The consumer demand test can be satisfied by either direct or indirect
21 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992);
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 3 (1984).
22 j. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 20
(2001).
23 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 3. This test was further enunciated in Image Tech.
Servs., 504 U.S. at 461-62.
24 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 21.
27 Id. at 21-22.
28 Id.
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evidence. Directly, a plaintiff may offer evidence of demand for the tied
product 9 In the absence of direct evidence, aplaintiff may offer evidence
of the behavior of the "competitive fringe."3  The competitive fringe's
behavior-or the defendant's industry's custom-serves as indirect
evidence of consumer demand.3' If it is customary in the defendant's
industry to combine certain products, then little demand must exist for
either product by itself. Conversely, if the defendant is the only firm in its
industry to combine the products in question, separate demand for each
product is likely to exist.
If a plaintiff can satisfy the consumer demand test and show that the
defendant conditioned the sale of the tying product on the purchase of the
separate tied product, enjoyed leveraging power in the tying product's
market, and thereby foreclosed a substantial amount of competition in the
tied product's market, 32 the defendant likely will be found in per se
violation of antitrust law.33 Thus, the defendant could not traditionally raise
economic efficiency or consumer preference arguments as defenses. Nor
will the defendant be able to rebut the plaintiffs argument that its practices
restrain competition.
However, in some instances, courts have not applied a per se rule and
instead allow the defendant to continue tying with impunity. If the
defendant can produce certain business justifications for its practices,
which outweigh the potential harm to competition, the court will allow the
tie-in. One such permissible business justification requires that the
"specifications for a substitute [of a tied product] would be so detailed that
they could not practicably be supplied."'  Thus, the defendant itself must
29 Id.
30 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 1744c4, at 200.
31 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 22 n.36; see also Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
32 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992);
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 3.
33 See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). In Northern Pacific
Railway v. United States, the Court explained the marketplace rationale for a per se rule
against tying arrangements as follows:
When tying arrangements are successfully exacted competition on the merits with
respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed .... They deny competitors free
access to the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying
requirements has a better product or a lower price but because of his power or
leverage in another market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free
choice between competing products.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
34 Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). This case is
commonly referred to as Standard Stations.
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be allowed to supply the tied product. It is for this reason that an ice cream
franchisor can tie the purchase of ice cream ingredients-which are,
apparently, difficult to describe-with ice cream making equipment.
35
A second business justification that renders tying permissible involves
a smaller new entrant attempting to gain a "toehold" in a market occupied
by powerful, larger competitors. 36 Courts may justify casting a blind eye
toward otherwise per se illegal tie-ins by evaluating the overall pro-
competitive effects of a more diverse market 7  The third permissible
business justification exists when a defendant uses tie-ins to ensure product
quality.38 However, under this justification, the tie-in must be a last resort
to provide a quality product 39 and must cease once no longer necessary to
affect a quality product.40 Finally, the defendant who asserts a justification
in response to a tying accusation bears the burden to prove that the tie-in
was enacted for a permissible business reason, and not merely as an attempt
to restrain trade.4 1
By entertaining these business justifications, courts carve out small
exceptions to per se liability for tying.42 These sui generis exceptions serve
as evidence that the courts, like economists, are becoming more receptive to
business justifications for tying. The remainder of this Article offers a more
35 See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381
U.S. 125 (1965).
36 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962) ("Thus, unless
the tying device is employed by a small company in an attempt to break into a market.., the
use of a tying device can rarely be harmonized with the strictures of the antitrust laws, which
are intended primarily to preserve and stimulate competition.") (internal citations omitted).
37 See id.
38 See Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656 (1st Cir. 1961);
United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
39 See Dehydrating Process Co., 292 F.2d at 656, wherein the defendant tied a patented
silo-unloading device with a patented glass-lined silo. While silos were available from other
manufacturers, use of these other silos in conjunction with the defendant's unloader resulted
in frequent malfunction and a fifty percent customer dissatisfaction rate. Id. After selling
the unloader untied for seven years, the defendants opted to tie the loader and silo to reduce
customer complaints and improve product quality. Id. The court found this arrangement to
be a permissible means to ensure product quality since no other manufacturer made a silo
that with specifications that would permit the defendant's loader to work properly. Id.
40 See Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. at 554-60. In Jerrold Electronics, the court
allowed an electronics manufacturer to tie portions of a cable television master antenna
system. Id. Although the defendant did not manufacture every component of the system, it
was allowed to sell the system only as a whole in order to ensure that the system properly
functioned. Id. However, the court held that the defendant could only engage in tying until
the system was perfected; after such time, the tie-in would no longer be necessary to ensure
product quality. Id.
41 Id. at 560.
42 See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
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recent example of how the American judiciary, through economic analysis,
continues to exempt certain situations from the per se rule against tying,
while the European Union generally refuses to retreat from per se liability.
B. Tying Jurisprudence in Software Bundling
Instances of courts applying tying law to situations in which a
manufacturer conditions the sale of one piece of software on the purchase of
another are rare. 43 Most software-related tying claims arise when software
is tied to hardware or services, 4 which implicate different economic
concerns than in the software bundling context. Thus, the precedent on
which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Microsoft III could draw was
sparse and, according to the court, of little help.45
The first case to address software bundling was Innovation Data
Processing, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp.46 The court was
presented with the question of whether IBM's practice of grouping a
backup and restore utility program with an operating system ("OS")-
which, incidentally, rendered obsolete the plaintiff-competitor's backup
utility-amounted to a tying violation of the Sherman Act.47 The district
court alluded to economic efficiencies associated with bundling software
programs and found the two programs at issue could be "reasonably
considered to constitute parts of a single distinct product" because they48
were technologically integrated to a sufficient degree. Thus, the court
found the two programs at issue comprised an integrated product for
efficiency reasons.49 The court constructed what seems to be an exception
to per se liability for tying in this context. It suggested that plaintiffs
challenging software bundling as tie-ins must make a stronger showing than
43 In Microsoft II1, 253 F.3d 34, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals found only four such cases.
44 See id. at 91 (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761
(7th Cir. 1996); Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 941 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1991);
Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341-47 (9th Cir. 1984); Cal. Computer
Prods. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 743-44; ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 233 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (finding that defendant's
integration of magnetic disks and a head/disk assembly was not an unlawful tie), afj'd per
curiam sub. nom. Memorex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (9th Cir.
1983)).
45 Microsoft 1, 253 F.3d at 91.
46 Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1470 (D.
N.J. 1984).
41 Id. at 1471-75.
48 Id. at 1475 (quoting Int'l Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied sub nom., Jacuzzi Bros., Inc. v. Landon, Inc., 379 U.S. 988 (1965)).
49 See id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:421 (2007)
in other tying cases. 5°
Innovation Data Processing could have taken the place of the
Microsoft decisions, insofar as software tying, and brought to the Third
Circuit's attention the inherent tension between software bundling and tying
law. The district court issued its ruling just three days after the Supreme
Court handed down Jefferson Parrish and made no mention of the newly-
minted consumer demand test for whether two separate products were
involved.51 Thus, the case begged for a review, in light of Jefferson
Parrish, which would have forced the Third Circuit to apply the consumer
demand test to software bundling. However, Innovation Data Processing
missed its chance to clarify the law of software bundling because of its
posture. The court ultimately found for the defendant because IBM also
offered the two programs separately, and the case was not appealed.52
Thus, the court's language regarding separate or integrated products was at
best an alternate holding and at worst dictum If the court had not presented
an alternate, infalible basis for its holding, Innovation Data Processing
could have easily served as the impetus for clarification of tying law as
applied to software bundling.
Fifteen years later, well after the consumer demand test had been
established by Jefferson Parrish53 and refined by Image Tech,5 4 software
bundling again surfaced on the antitrust horizon in Caldera, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp.55 In Caldera, a competitor challenged Microsoft's practice
50 Id. at 1476.
As a general rule... the development and introduction of a system of
technologically interrelated products is not sufficient alone to establish a per se
unlawful tying arrangement even if the new products are incompatable [sic] with
the products then offered by the competition and effective use of any one of the
new products necessitates purchase of some or all of the others.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 703 F.2d 534,
542-43 (9th Cir. 1983)).
51 Innovation Data Processing, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1470 (case decided on March 30,
1984); cf Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (case decided on
March 27, 1984).
52 Innovation Data Processing, Inc., 585 F. Supp. at 1475 ("Of course where the buyer is
free to take either product by itself, there is no tying problem even though the seller may also
offer the two items as a unit at a single price." (quoting N. Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1958))).
53 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 3.
54 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Sews., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992).
55 Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999). Although A.!.
Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 675-77 (6th Cir. 1986), involved a
software manufacturer that conditioned the sale of its OS on the purchase of other software
applications, the court found for the defendant Computer/Dynamics because it did not enjoy
sufficient market power in the tying good's market. Thus, the court did not submit the
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of integrating the MS-DOS OS and Windows 3.1 graphical user interface
("GUI") in what would ultimately converge to form Windows 95.56
Microsoft responded by arguing that Windows 95 was an integrated product
the likes of which the market had never seen, 57 and proposed a test for
integration that would deem any software bundle which produced some
advantage-but not necessarily a net advantage or positive sum gain-an
integrated program.58
The district court rejected Microsoft's proposal as contrary to the
consumer demand test and thus prohibited by the binding precedent of
Jefferson Parrish and Image Tech. 59  However, given the level of
technological innovation present in the case before it, but not present in
Jefferson Parrish, the court hesitated to second-guess Microsoft's program
architecture and to rely completely on the consumer demand test.
60
In what seems a compromise between Microsoft's proposal and the
unchanged black letter of Jefferson Parrish and Image Tech., the district
court created this rule: "[I]f the evidence shows that a valid, not
insignificant, technological improvement has been achieved by the
integration of two products, then in essence a new product has been created,
and a defendant is insulated from [Sherman Act] § 1 tying liability"'6I
because there is no tying of separate products. But the court exercised care
not to stray too far from the traditional consumer demand test:
In determining whether a technological advance has essentially
created a new product through integration, the two products that have
been integrated must be joined for technological reasons. In other
words, in the spirit of Jefferson Parish, this analysis requires the
integration to be driven by technology rather than by marketing.
62
To satisfy this test, a defendant must show more than a subjective
desire to improve its product or sales; it must demonstrate objectively
measurable efficiencies derived from integration.63
bundle to any sort of efficiency analysis.
56 Caldera, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.
57 Id. at 1320. Microsoft's argument is now familiar, if not shopworn. It continues to
argue that its technology outpaces the law, and that, therefore, the law should adapt. See
infra Part II.C.
58 Caldera, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1322-23. Notably, Microsoft's proposed rule is identical to
the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of a consent decree between the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and Microsoft in which Microsoft agreed not to engage in software
tying. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
59 Caldera, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1323.
60 id.
61 Id. at 1325.
62 Id. at 1326 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984)).
63 Caldera, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1325 ("[A] product improvement motivation-at least
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The court applied its augmented consumer demand test to conclude
that Microsoft was not entitled to summary judgment regarding the issue of
integrated or separate products.64 Specifically, the court found that a
question of fact existed with respect to whether Microsoft integrated MS
DOS and Windows 3.1 for marketing or efficiency reasons.65 However,
Caldera never proceeded to trial, and the relationship between software
bundling and tying law remained unclear.
The last software bundling case to surface before Microsoft III was the
similar but unrelated Microsoft II.66 At trial, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") alleged a violation of a consent decree to which both parties had
assented, and initiated a civil contempt proceeding against Microsoft. 67 The
decree addressed, inter alia, Microsoft's practice of bundling its Internet
Explorer web browser with its ubiquitous Windows 95 OS and prohibited
"Microsoft from entering into any operating system license agreement that
is 'expressly or impliedly conditioned upon the licensing of any... other
product."' 68 However, this agreement provided the caveat that it "shall not
be construed to prohibit Microsoft from developing integrated products. 69
The language and effect of this decree drove the ensuing litigation. The
district court (and later the circuit court) had to determine "whether Internet
Explorer is to be deemed as 'integrated' component of Windows 95, or, to
the contrary, an 'other product,' distinct and severable from the operating
system without otherwise impairing the system's operational integrity. 7°
The DOJ contended that Internet Explorer "possesses both a physical
and commercial existence of its own, separate and apart froin any Microsoft
operating system," and therefore was not integrated with Windows 95.71
Microsoft, of course, argued that Windows 95 and Internet Explorer were
without something more, such as demonstrated efficiencies-will not save an otherwise
illegal tying arrangement under § 1." (quoting Multistate Legal Studies v. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1551 n.9 (10th Cir.
1995))).
64 Caldera, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1328.
65 Id. at 1326-27. The court found instructive Microsoft employees' statements that MS
DOS and Windows 3.1 were "stuck together with baling wire and bubble gum" as a matter
of marketing, and not technological necessity. Id. at 1326 (internal citations omitted). In
fact, these two underlying programs in Windows 95 shared no code; one could function
independently of the other. Id. at 1327.
66 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997), stay granted, No.
97-5343, 1998 WL 236582 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 1998), and rev'd, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir.
1998) [hereinafter Microsoft 1].
67 Microsoft II, 980 F. Supp. at 539.
68 Id. at 540 (quoting Consent Decree § IV(E)(i)).
69 Id. at 539 n.2.
70 Id. at 540 (quoting Consent Decree § IV(E)(i)).
71 Id.
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integrated products as contemplated by the decree.72  While the district
court analyzed traditional tying jurisprudence and considered Jefferson
Parrish and Image Tech., 7 it made clear the constraints placed on it by
procedural posture.7 4 Because the court was interpreting a consent decree
in a civil contempt proceeding, it was bound by considerations that would
not have applied if the court had simply been interpreting antitrust law.
Although the court found that Microsoft offered a plausible interpretation of
the consent decree, it also found the DOJ's interpretation convincing.75 The
court resolved the disputed interpretation of the consent decree by
concluding that the DOJ had not carried its evidentiary burden in the
contempt proceeding.76  It was, however, willing to preliminarily enjoin
Microsoft from continuing to bundle Internet Explorer and Windows.
77
On appeal, the circuit court reached a different result. The court
overturned the preliminary injunction which prohibited Microsoft from
continuing to bundle Windows and Internet Explorer.78 Then, the circuit
court undertook to interpret a portion of the consent decree to determine
whether Microsoft had expressly or impliedly conditioned license of
Windows 95 on license of Internet Explorer.7V Thus, it had to decide
whether Windows and Internet Explorer were separate or integrated
products.
In its separate or integrated products inquiry, the circuit court looked
first and foremost within the four corners of the consent decree and the
72 Id.
73 Microsoft II, 980 F. Supp. at 542-43.
74 See id. at 541. In discussing procedural constraints, the district court stated:
The Court must resolve any ambiguities in the terms of the Final Judgment in
favor of Microsoft, the party charged with contempt. Microsoft offers a plausible
interpretation of what it considers to be an "integrated product" as the term is used
in § IV(E)(i): a product that "combines" or "unites" functions that, although
capable of functioning independently, undoubtedly complement one another.
Windows 95 and Internet Explorer enjoy such a synergy, Microsoft argues.
As Microsoft correctly observes, placing reliance on amorphous considerations,
requiring the balancing of multiple factors to ascertain whether a party subject to a
judicial order is in violation of its terms, is inconsistent with the requirement that a
judicial order provide "explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed.
Id.
". Id. at 541-42.
76 Id. at 541.
7 Id. at 546.
78 Microsoft II, 147 F.3d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Microsoft argues that the district
court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1)'s command, 'No
preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party.' We agree.").
" Id. at 946.
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circumstances surrounding the decree's formation. The court first
established a point of reference: It interpreted the decree to contemplate the
Windows 3.11 GUI and the MS-DOS OS as separate products, but deem
the component GUI and OS in Windows 95 as integrated products.80 Thus,
if the court found that the Windows 95/Internet Explorer bundle was more
like the combination of the Windows 3.11 GUI and MS-DOS OS, it would
deem Windows 95 and Internet Explorer separate products capable of
violating the decree. 81 Conversely, if it decided that Windows 95 and
Internet Explorer more closely resembled the component GUI and OS in
Windows 95 itself, then the court would label Windows 95 and Internet
Explorer integrated products which, if combined, would not violate the
decree.82
The court did not use antitrust law to distinguish between the
impermissible bundle of the Windows 3.11 GUI and MS-DOS OS and the
permissible bundle of the component parts of Windows 95. Instead, it
made this distinction based upon Microsoft's and the DOJ's objectively
manifested intent. Thus, the court founded its entire analysis on contract
interpretation and not antitrust law.
83
However, the D.C. Circuit did address the law which would have
controlled its inquiry had it not been interpreting a consent decree. The
court first took the liberty of questioning the consumer demand test's
effectiveness in the situation before it.84 Second, the court defined the term
"integration" under the consent decree as "any genuine technological
integration, regardless of whether elements of the integrated package are
80 Id.
81 id.
82 Id. The court reasoned that:
Whatever else § IV(E)(i) [of the consent decree] does, it must forbid a tie-in
between Windows 3.11 and MS-DOS, and it must permit Windows 95. Thus if the
relation between Windows 95 and Internet Explorer is similar to the relation
between Windows 3.11 and MS-DOS, the link is presumably barred by § IV(E)(i).
On the other hand, a counter-analogy is Windows 95 itself, which the decree
explicitly recognizes as a single "product" (it defines it as a "Covered Product," §
II(1)(v)), even though, as we have said, Windows 95 combines the functionalities
of a graphical interface and an operating system. If the Windows 95/[Internet
Explorer] combination is like the MS-DOS/graphical interface combination that
comprises Windows 95 itself, then it must be permissible.
Id.
83 Id. (citations omitted). ("The court's task, then, is to discern the bargain that the
parties struck; this is the sense behind the proposition that consent decrees are to be
interpreted as contracts.").
84 Microsoft 11, 147 F.3d at 947-48.




The court's definition of integration has two requirements. First, the
combination must "be different from what the purchaser could create from
the separate products on his own; ' 86 it must be an example of a "physical or
technological interlinkage that the customer cannot perform. 87 The court
found that the Windows 95/Internet Explorer combination fulfilled this
requirement. This combination was technologically interlinked because
Internet Explorer code was interwoven with the Windows 95 OS code.88
Second, the combination must be value-adding and create some
advantage as compared to the two pre-integrated products. 89 Likewise, the
court found the Windows 95/Internet Explorer combination to add value.
The court referred to the combination as an upgrade, whereby Windows OS
gained "browser functionality." 90  Finally, the circuit court held that
Windows 95 and Internet Explorer more closely resembled the component
GUI and OS in Windows 95. 1 Therefore, it was "inclined to conclude that
the Windows 95/Internet Explorer package is a genuine integration;
consequently, [the consent decree] does not bar Microsoft from offering it
as one product. 92
The court's integrated products definition disregarded whether
consumer demand for the component products exists and technically
contradicts the consumer demand test of Jefferson Parrish and Image Tech.
Nonetheless, the court attempted to square its holding with tying law.93 In
effect, the court explained that the consumer demand test for the existence
of a tying arrangement was ill-suited to examine technological innovation
and that the Supreme Court would not apply the test to such technologically
85 Id. at 948.
86 Id. at 949.
87 Id. (quoting 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 1746b, at 227-28).
88 Id. at 952.
89 See id. at 949. The appellate court stated:
Manufacturers can stick products together in ways that purchasers cannot without
the link serving any purpose but an anticompetitive one. The concept of integration
should exclude a case where the manufacturer has done nothing more than to
metaphorically "bolt" two products together, as would be true if Windows 95 were
artificially rigged to crash if IEXPLORE.EXE were deleted.
Id. at 949.
90 Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 952.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 The court's foray into tying law is rank dicta. Recall the court was interpreting a
consent decree-a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant-and was not faced with the
question of whether Microsoft's conduct violated tying law.
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innovative integration.9 q Therefore, the court implied, it was free to craft its
own separate products test for technologically innovative products-or at
least software bundling. However, the D.C. Circuit's new test was
precedentially limited and easily distinguishable. As indicated above, the
court was not applying antitrust law and Jefferson Parrish and Image Tech.
did not govern; it was simply interpreting a contract.
C. The State of Software Tying Law Before Microsoft III
A review of the tying jurisprudence of software bundling does not
produce a clear rule but does glean an apparent trend.95 What is clear is that
courts hesitate in applying the now traditional consumer demand test to
technologically innovative software bundling. 96 Instead, they are willing to
supplement or modify the traditional consumer demand test to
accommodate technological innovation.
In Caldera, the District of Utah modified the consumer demand test to
allow innovative software bundling that was motivated by technological
and not marketing considerations and which produced an objectively
measurable efficiency gain.97  But the court did not ignore consumer
demand and did not shun Jefferson Parrish and Image Tech. The district
court's test was groundbreaking in that it apparently anticipates consumer
demand: programs validly and significantly improved by integration-
thereby satisfying the court's criterion for integrated products-could
displace consumer demand for non-integrated programs and satisfy the
consumer demand test with minimal accommodation for new technology.
Similarly, in Microsoft II, the D.C. Circuit focused on the type and
effect of the bundle. If the software bundle was truly innovative (i.e., was
not simply a bolt-on of two separate products and was value-adding), then it
was an integrated product, notwithstanding consumer demand.98 The circuit
court attempted to square its decision with the consumer demand test by
94 See Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 950. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals opined:
We believe this [definition of integrated products] is consistent with tying law. The
Court in... Image Tech ... , for example, found parts and service separate
products because sufficient consumer demand existed to make separate provision
efficient. But we doubt that it would have subjected a self-repairing copier to the
same analysis; i.e., the separate markets for parts and service would not suggest
that such an innovation was really a tie-in.
Id. 95 See supra Part II.B.
96 See Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 947-48; Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d
1295, 1323 (D. Utah 1999).
97 Caldera, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
98 Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 949.
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arguing that Jefferson Parrish and Image Tech. were not controlling in
innovative combinations.99 However, like the district court in Caldera, the
circuit court's new test was more akin to a modification of the consumer
demand test than a new test altogether: The test merely sought to anticipate
consumer demand for the innovative bundle.
The district court's test in Caldera, and the circuit court's test in
Microsoft I-whether knowingly or unknowingly-provide an answer to
one of Microsoft's strongest arguments used over the course of its antitrust
litigation. Microsoft has argued broadly that the consumer demand test
fails when applied to new technology.10 0 A truly innovative product, it has
contended, creates its own demand ab innitio.' ' This soon-to-be-created
demand for the integrated product will displace the demand for the tied
product and would, therefore, satisfy the consumer demand test at some
point in the future.
But future demand is not cognizable under the Jefferson Parrish
consumer demand test, which is backward-looking. The test focuses on
demand for the tied product at the time the plaintiff first introduces its
bundled products and looks at the condition of the market before the
plaintiffs bundle affects consumer demand. 0 2  Thus, a truly innovative
product-one that displaces demand for current competing products-will
never pass the Jefferson Parrish-Image Tech. version of the consumer
demand test and will always be considered a combination of two separate
products. The rules in Caldera and Microsoft II solve this catch-22 by
anticipating future demand. If this newly created demand will be strong
enough to displace demand for the tied product-that is, if the combination
of products is a "valid, not insignificant, technological improvement
'03
which will render the tied product obsolete to consumers-then the
combination would fulfill the consumer demand test, even though it does
not do so now.
III. MICROSOFT III
In 2001, just three years after addressing Microsoft II, the D.C. Circuit
again faced the legality of Microsoft's Windows/Internet Explorer bundle in
Microsoft I1. 104 This time around, however, the court was charged with
99 Id. at 950.
10o See Microsoft 111, 253 F.3d at 87-89.
101 See id.
102 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984); Microsoft
III, 253 F.3d at 89; 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 1746, at 224-29.
103 Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1325 (D. Utah 1999).
104 Microsoft Ii, 253 F.3d at 47. The court aptly summarized the case's tortured
procedural history, stating:
In July 1994, officials at the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), on behalf of the
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interpreting antitrust law instead of a consent decree. 10 5  Again, the
plaintiffs alleged per se tying liability, while Microsoft countered with an
integrated products argument. 106
At trial, the district court applied the traditional Jefferson Parrish-
Image Tech. consumer demand test to find that Internet Explorer is a
product separate from both the Windows 95 and 98 OSs.'17 The court
dismissed the fact that Internet Explorer code was commingled with
Windows. 108 It focused on "commercial reality" instead of "what might
appear to be reasonable" to conclude that "consumers today perceive
operating systems and browsers as separate 'products,' for which there is
separate demand." 109 Thus, the district court held Microsoft liable for tying
under Jefferson Parrish and Image Tech. "10
On appeal, the circuit court questioned the district court's strict
application of the consumer demand test to Internet Explorer and the
Windows 95 and 98 OSs."' .The court's primary concern was whether the
test could adequately determine if such technologically advanced products
are integrated or separate. 12 The court began by exploring the rationale
behind the consumer demand test, which, it reasoned, "is a rough proxy for
United States, filed suit against Microsoft, charging the company with, among
other things, unlawfully maintaining a monopoly in the operating system market
through anticompetitive terms in its licensing and software developer agreements.
The parties subsequently entered into a consent decree, thus avoiding a trial on the
merits. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
("Microsoft 1"). Three years later, the Justice Department filed a civil contempt
action against Microsoft for allegedly violating one of the decree's provisions. On
appeal from a grant of a preliminary injunction, this court held that Microsoft's
technological bundling of Internet Explorer 3.0 and 4.0 with Windows 95 did not
violate the relevant provision of the consent decree. United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Microsoft IF'). We expressly reserved the
question whether such bundling might independently violate §§ 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act.
On May 18, 1998, shortly before issuance of the Microsoft H decision, the United
States and a group of State plaintiffs filed separate (and soon thereafter
consolidated) complaints, asserting antitrust violations by Microsoft and seeking




106 Id. at 85.
107 Microsoft 11, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 48-51 (D.D.C. 2000).
108 Id. at 49.
109 Id.
110 Id.
. See id. at 48-51.
112 Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 87-88.
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whether a tying arrangement may, on balance, be welfare-enhancing, and
unsuited to per se condemnation."'" 3 "In other words," the court reasoned,
"perceptible separate demand is inversely proportional to [welfare-
enhancing] net efficiencies."' 14 The court cautioned that Jefferson Parrish
promulgated the consumer demand test to displace these time-consuming
considerations of welfare enhancement and network efficiencies.
Nonetheless, it reviewed the district court's separate products decision in
light of these considerations.
By delving into the economic considerations for which the consumer
demand test serves as proxy, the court began its review with the premise
that "the separate-products element of the per se rule may not give newly
integrated products a fair shake."'"16 Chief among the court's concerns was
the notion that the consumer demand test is backward-looking and cannot
appreciate demand-displacing technological innovation." 7
More specifically, the court doubted that the Supreme Court intended
the consumer demand test to apply to software bundling because of the
"undue risks of error and of deterring welfare-enhancing innovation."" 18
With this perspective the court looked to earlier tying cases for
guidance. The court did not find helpful any of the software tying cases
available.' ' 9 The court brushed aside Caldera and distinguished its prior
holding in Microsoft II as merely an interpretation of a consent decree, not
antitrust law.' 20 Thus, the circuit court found itself in uncharted waters. It
reasoned that neither its own decisions nor the decisions of lower or higher
courts addressed the issue before it.
After allaying concerns of stare decisis, the court crafted the economic
foundation of a new mode of analysis for tying charges in software
bundling.' 2' First, the court reiterated the problem with the backward-
looking consumer demand test and innovative products. 22  Second, the
''1 Id. at 87.
114 Id. at 87-88.
"' Id. at 88.
116 Id. at 89.
117 Id.; see supra Part II.C.
118 Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 89-90.
119 Id. at 90. For a list of these cases, see supra Part II.B.
120 Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 92 ("While we believed our interpretation of the term
'integrated product' was consistent with the test for separate products under tying law, we
made clear that the 'antitrust question is of course distinct."' (quoting Microsoft II, 147 F.3d
at 950 n.14, and citing Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Utah
1999))).
121 Id. (noting that "[w]hile the paucity of cases examining software bundling suggests a
high risk that per se analysis may produce inaccurate results, the nature of the platform
software market affirmatively suggests that per se rules might stunt valuable innovation.").
122 Id. at 92-93.
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court reasoned that software bundling must create efficiencies because even
firms without market power-which cannot coerce consumers into
purchasing a tied product-bundle software.123 Although the court recited
several possible bundling efficiencies, it was more concerned with the
efficiencies it could not anticipate. 124 To allow for unanticipated efficiency
arguments, the court announced that, without regard to the "single product"
defense, tying charges stemming from software bundling would no longer
be subject to a per se analysis.125 Now, the court held, software bundling is
to be analyzed under a more flexible rule of reason.
1 26
Generally, the rule of reason proscribes unnecessary, purposeful, or
overpowerful restraints on competition. 127 The rule is context-specific and
fact-intensive; it provides little bright-line predictability. Unfortunately, the
circuit court provided little guidance for distinguishing reasonable from
unreasonable software bundles. It merely instructed trial courts to focus on
the effect of the bundle and balance its economic efficiencies against its
competitive restraints.
28
123 Id. at 93 ("Firms without market power have no incentive to package different pieces
of software together unless there are efficiency gains from doing so. The ubiquity of
bundling in competitive platform software markets should give courts reason to pause before
condemning such behavior in less competitive markets.").
124 Id. at 93-95.
125 Id. at 95.
126 In Microsoft III, the circuit court attempted to limit this rule to the facts before it:
Our judgment regarding the comparative merits of the per se rule and the rule of
reason is confined to the tying arrangement before us, where the tying product is
software whose major purpose is to serve as a platform for third-party applications
and the tied product is complementary software functionality. While our reasoning
may at times appear to have broader force, we do not have the confidence to speak
to facts outside the record, which contains scant discussion of software integration
generally.
Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 95. Although a new tying rule for OS/application bundles is
monumental in itself, the court's language suggests wider applicability. The court's broad
language and sweeping economic policy analysis can easily be adapted to analogous fact
patterns.
127 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1911) (prohibiting, under
the rule of reason, restraints which are undue as measured by anti-competitive effect);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (holding that the rule of
reason prohibits naked restraints while allowing ancillary restraints).
128 Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 95.
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IV. THE LAW OF TYING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. Source of Law: A Brief Overview
The Treaty of Rome is the wellspring of E.C. competition law.1
29
Article 81, analog of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 30 prohibits "all
agreements between undertakings [(business entities)], decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market .... ,,13 More specifically, Article 81 prohibits anticompetitive
agreements or measures "which make the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts." 32 In other words, Article 81 prohibits tying.
Article 82 corresponds to section 2 of the Sherman Act, 133 and forbids
undertakings from abusing a dominant (i.e., monopolistic) position.1 34 Like
Article 81, Article 82 also prohibits tying. Specifically, Article 82
disallows an undertaking from "making the conclusion of contracts subject
to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts."'' 35  Thus, while Article 81 prohibits
anticompetitive tying regardless of the undertaking's market power,' 36
Article 82 prohibits tying by an undertaking in a dominant position
regardless of actual anticompetitive effect. 137
129 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, as renumbered by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C224/79), 31
I.L.M. 247 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
130 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (prohibiting agreements in restrain of trade).
131 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 129, art. 81(1).
132 Id. art. 81(l)(e).
133 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (requiring, for a violation, monopoly power and prohibited
conduct or abuse). For a determination of monopoly power, see Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). For a discussion of prohibited conduct by a
monopolist, see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
134 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 129, art. 82. For a determination of market power
sufficient to constitute a dominant position, see Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v.
Commission, [1979] E.C.R. 461. For a discussion of abusive conduct, see Case COMP/C-
3/37.792, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, (unreported, Mar. 24, 2004) (CEC), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
135 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 129, art. 82(d).
136 Id. art. 81(1)(e)
137 Id. art. 82(d).
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B. Procedure and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The E.C., headed by the Directorate-General for Competition, has
authority to investigate and prosecute competition cases.1 38  Unlike U.S.
antitrust law, E.C. competition law does not grant individual citizens
standing to sue. Only the E.C. may prosecute a competition complaint.
Nonetheless, private parties play an influential role in E.C. competition
litigation by acting as amici curiae. 39 In fact, almost anyone can file a
complaint to be pursued by the E.C. 40 Upon receipt of this complaint, the
E.C. sends the targeted undertaking a formal discovery request, to which it
has four weeks to respond.14' The E.C. then analyzes the undertaking's
response. It may decide to decline prosecution or it may issue a formal
Statement of Objections. 42 If the E.C. opts to prosecute, the undertaking
has two months to produce a written defense, which is analogous to an
appellate brief. 43 The targeted undertaking will then appear in front of the
E.C. for a formal hearing which resembles appellate oral argument in the
United States. 44  The E.C. takes the matter under advisement, and may
order monetary or injunctive relief145 This order is appealable to the Court
of First Instance ("C.F.I.") in Luxembourg, and finally to the European
Court of Justice ("E.C.J.").
The E.C. enjoys jurisdiction over many non-E.U. undertakings. In
fact, the E.C. may impose its ruling on a corporation that has no offices
within the European Union provided that the corporation conducts business
in the European Union and that business produces an appreciable effect
prohibited by E.C. competition laws.
46
138 See, e.g., Europa Website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/indexen.html (last
visited Dec. 13, 2004).
139 See Dawn Kawamoto & Matt Hines, Microsoft to Pay Novell US$536 million
settlement, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 9, 2004, http://asia.cnet.com/news/software/
0,39037051,39200403,00.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). In a recent settlement of U.S.
antitrust litigation, Microsoft paid Novell $536 million. Included in that settlement was an
agreement by Novell not to pursue E.C. enforcement. Novell's ability to influence the
proceedings must have been substantial to warrant a portion of such a sum.
140 Barbara Crutchfield George et al., Increasing Extraterritorial Intrusion of European
Union Authority into U.S. Business Mergers and Competition Practices: U.S. Multinational
Businesses Underestimate the Strength of the European Commission from G.E. -Honeywell to
Microsoft, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 571, 589 (2004) ("E.C. procedures allow competitors,







146 See Case 89/85, Wood Pulp Case, 1988 E.C.R. 5193; Yeo Jin Chun, The GE-
Honeywell Merger Debacle: The Enforcement of Antitrust/Competition Laws Across the
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In a 2002 article, Yeo Jin Chun discussed the European Union's
position on extraterritorial jurisdiction in competition law, stating:
European law requires that there be a prohibited effect, but whereas
American common law requires intent, the European Court of Justice
requires none. 'The decisive factor' in deciding whether there was a
violation of common market competition law is where the
agreement, decision or concerted practice was 'implemented.' Also,
the European Court of Justice will find violations of Articles 81 and
82 if the conduct has prohibited effects on the common market,
direct or indirect, actual or potential. The European Court of Justice
also does not require substantial effects but rather appreciable
effects. An appreciable standard is a lower threshold test than a
substantial standard.
147
Thus, the threshold for extraterritorial jurisdiction in E.C. competition
litigation is extraordinarily low, even when compared with the far-reaching
Sherman Act. E.U. competition law can easily include U.S. firms engaged
in multinational commerce and surely includes Microsoft Corporation.
V. MICROSOFT VERSUS COMMISSION
In its 302 page opinion resolving the challenge against Microsoft, the
E.C. scrutinized Microsoft's business practices in relation to competition
law. 148 Microsoft's practices included bundling Windows Media Player and
Windows OS. The E.C. examined the Windows OS/Windows Media
Player bundle under Article 82(d) to determine whether Microsoft was
guilty of tying. 149 The E.C. first detailed the four elements of an Article
82(d) tying offense:
Tying prohibited under Article 82 of the Treaty requires the presence
of the following elements: (i) the tying and tied goods are two
separate products; (ii) the undertaking concerned is dominant in the
tying product market; (iii) the undertaking concerned does not give
customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied
product; and (iv) tying forecloses competition. 150
Atlantic Pond, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 61, 75-76 (2002); David J. Feeney, The European
Commission's Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Corporate Mergers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
425,440-41 (2002).
141 See id. at 75-76 (footnotes omitted).
148 See Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, (unreported, Mar. 24,
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According to the E.C., Microsoft's Windows OS-Windows Media
Player bundle easily satisfied some of the elements described above.
The E.C. wasted little time determining that Microsoft enjoyed
dominance in the tying product's market. 51 It defined the market for the
tying product-Windows OS-by measuring cross-elasticity of demand.
The E.C. refused to consider non-Intel personal computer ("PC") operating
systems as part of the Windows OS market since these operating systems
did not "alter the result of the assessment of Microsoft's market power.,
152
Thus, the E.C. disregarded Macintosh OS. To augment its demand
analysis, the E.C. also examined cross-elasticity of supply within the market
for Windows OS. It considered entry barriers to potential competitors and
concluded that the research, design, marketing, and hardware-software
interface aspects of the Intel PC OS market serve to exclude potential
entrants. 153 The E.C. concluded that significant entry barriers protected
established firms within the relevant market for Windows OS-which the
E.C. limited to only Intel PC OSs.154 Windows enjoyed a dominant position
within that market, the E.C. concluded. 155  The E.C. also summarily
determined that Microsoft "does not give customers a choice to obtain the
tying product without the tied product" because Microsoft did not offer
Windows OS without Windows Media Player.
156
Moreover, the E.C. had little trouble finding that Microsoft's tying of
Windows Media Player to Windows OS forecloses competition in the
market for media players, and stated:
The Court of Justice has stated that it constitutes an abuse when an
undertaking in a dominant position directly or indirectly ties its
customer by a supply obligation since this deprives the customer of
the ability to choose freely his sources of supply and denies other
producers access to the market. 157
Microsoft offered procompetitive justifications, reminded the E.C. that
its installation agreements allowed hardware manufacturers to uninstall
Windows Media Player, and pointed to the popular practice of downloading
competing media players such as Nullsoft's Winamp.15 8 However, the E.C.
rejected Microsoft's justifications: it held that the sheer prevalence of
Windows OS and Windows Media Player precluded the E.C. from
'1 See id. 321-22.
152 Id. 326.
... See id. 334-41.
154 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft Corp., TT 334-41.
155 id.
156 Id. 794. See id. 796-98.
... Id. 835 (citing Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461).
158 Id. 849-71.
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entertaining procompetitive justifications. 5 9
Unlike elements (ii), (iii), and (iv) above, 60 the E.C. examined closely
the separate products inquiry.' 6 1 Microsoft argued that Windows Media
Player and Windows OS should not be considered separate products
because of existing consumer perception. In the minds of consumers,
Microsoft argued, PCs should be-and are-capable of displaying
multimedia without additional programs. 62 However, the E.C. rejected this
argument. It held that consumers view media players as distinct from
operating systems as evidenced by aftermarket, stand-alone media players
such as Winamp and Real Player.163  The E.C. did not, however, cite
empirical evidence on consumer perception. Thus, the E.C. heeded neither
Microsoft's consumer perception argument, nor its economic efficiency
argument, nor its more general procompetitive justification argument.
The E.C.'s decision regarding the separability of Windows OS and
Windows Media Player drew much commentary. Some argue that the E.C.
ignored the commercial usage exception to Article 82(d).164  The
commercial usage exception states that "[i]f there exists a demand for the
combination of the tying and tied products, [(i.e., consumer expectation)]
and combining the tying and tied goods has become commercial usage
[(i.e., custom)], then the E.C. will not pursue a tying charge."' 165 Thus,
selling shoes with shoelaces is not tying in violation of Article 82(d),
because consumers expect their shoes to come complete with laces, and
shoe sellers customarily include laces with their shoes.
These commentators advance a compelling argument that Windows
Media Player and Windows OS are not separable: 67 removing media-
159 See id. 843.
160 See supra text accompanying note 150.
161 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft Corp., 800 ("The existence of distinct products
is [a] precondition for tying. Products that are not distinct cannot be tied in a way that is
contrary to Article 82.").
162 Id. 400.
163 Id. Moreover, in rejecting Microsoft's argument, the Commission pointed out that
"consumers value finding a word processor already installed on their computer (and OEMs
often ship their client PCs with such a programme preinstalled). To the Commission's
knowledge, Microsoft has however not contested that word processors and operating systems
belong to separate relevant product markets." Id. 405 (citations omitted).
164 See, e.g., Gregory S. McCurdy, The European Commission's Media Player Remedy in
its Microsoft Decision: Compulsory Code Removal Despite The Absence Of Tying or
Foreclosure, EUROPEAN COMPETITION L.R. 25(11), 694-707 (2004).
165 Id. at 698.
166 Id.
167 See id. Professor McCurdy argues that operating systems and media players are
unlike cameras and film, razors and razor blades, guns and ammunition, and cars and
gasoline in that media players are neither physically distinct to nor useful without operating
systems. He likens Microsoft's practice of including Windows Media Player with Windows
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reading code from an OS, they argue, will compromise the OS's
functionality. 168 Consumers have come to expect this functionality and will
be disappointed to find their new computer unable to play any media, even
a compact disc, without adding aftermarket software.169  Moreover,
decoupling Windows Media Player from Windows OS will encourage other
media players to continue free-riding on the continued success and
popularity of Windows OS. 170  Thus, some observers conclude that
Windows Media Player and Windows OS are not separate products which
can be tied in violation of Article 82(d).
However, the E.C. did not find the commercial usage exception
persuasive. After dispatching Microsoft's separate products argument, the
E.C. found Microsoft in violation of Article 82(d). 71 As a remedy, the E.C.
ordered Microsoft to provide versions of Windows without Windows Media
Player within ninety days of the ruling, and levied an unprecedented fine of
E497 million. 172
VI. ANALYSIS
Commentators focusing on the macro aspects of these antitrust
decisions attribute the different outcomes of the Microsoft tying issues in
the United States and European Union to an essential difference in the
policies underlying the two jurisdictions' antitrust laws. 173 U.S. Antitrust
law is consumer oriented; it is not concerned with either individual
competitors or overall market structure. In short, "[i]t is competition, not
competitors, which the [Sherman] Act protects."' 1 4  By contrast, E.U.
competition law is more prescriptive in nature and is designed to foster a
specific market ideal. 175 E.U. competition law was designed "to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable
development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of
OS to a manufacturer who sells clock-radios, but does not offer a clock without the radio
functionality. He argues that even though separate markets exist for clocks and radios, the




170 McCurdy, supra note 164, at 694.
171 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, (unreported, March 24,
2004) (CEC), art. 6(a), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/
decisions/37792/en.pdf.
172 Id. art. 3.
173 See, e.g., Chun, supra note 146, at 64-65; Amanda Cohen, Note, Surveying the
Microsoft Antitrust Universe, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 333, 354 (2004).
174 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); Chun, supra note
146, at 64-65; Cohen, supra note 173, at 354.
175 See Chun, supra note 146, at 64-65; Cohen, supra note 173, at 354.
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social protection, equality between men and women... economic and
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States." 176 Thus, the focus is
on common market structure and harmony between member states with the
recognition of numerous stockholders in antitrust outcomes. With such
differing foci, it is not surprising that U.S. and E.U. antitrust law produced
such disparate results when applied to very similar software bundling
practices.
But the analysis of the global status of tying law as applied to software
bundling cannot stop here. To say that U.S. and E.U. antitrust
jurisprudence differ fundamentally, end of story, does little to help software
manufacturers innovating in a global market or software consumers seeking
to maximize their hardware. To truly evaluate the state of global software
tying jurisprudence, one must look to the costs and benefits of bundling.
Only then will the attendant costs and benefits of laws which constrain
bundling become apparent.
A. The Economic Calculus of Software Bundling
Like most areas of antitrust, tying law seeks to maximize consumer
welfare by striking a balance between competition and efficiency. Where
exactly this balance lies depends as much on political orientation as
economic analysis. The degree of emphasis of software bundling's various
effects on the market is contested; subjectively, this depends on the reader's
politicoeconomic leanings. Moreover, little empirical evidence of exactly
how software bundling impacts the market exists. Therefore, an economic
analysis of bundling is necessarily couched in general terms.'77
First, software markets are often touted as economies of scope. 7 8 An
economy of scope is a situation in which one firm can produce products A
and B as integrated products more efficiently than if it produced A and B
separately. Software manufacturers realize these efficiencies when they
combine portions of two or more pieces of software: the shared portion
does double duty; it reduces the overall lines of code, simplifies the
programs, and saves programming time and effort. However, the malleable
quality of code may minimize this efficiency argument. The cost to
replicate the shared portions of code-which represents a portion of the
opportunity cost savings of bundling-may be very low in some instances.
In the most clear-cut example a programmer would need only to slavishly
duplicate the shared portion in order to unbundle the previously integrated
program-an option that imposes little or no cost to the manufacturer.
Perhaps this helps to explain why courts have not been universally receptive
176 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 129, art. 2.
177 For a more complete analysis of the efficiency implications of software bundling, see
Sidak, supra note 22, at 6-19.
178 See id. at 30.
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to this argument.1
79
Second, the software industry exhibits substantial network effects. 80 '
Generally, network effects occur when units of a product interact with each
other and this interaction is essential or important to the product's
functionality. Network effects in the software industry stem primarily from
compatibility issues. For example, because Windows is the most popular
OS, and programs which operate within Windows are not usually
compatible with other OSs, Windows has network effects on the OS
market. But OSs are not the only type of software that experience network
effects. The dubious interoperability of the Microsoft Word and Corel
WordPerfect word processors also exerts strong network effects.
Network effects in the software industry can be both positive and
negative from a consumer's point of view. Network externalities afford
benefits to consumers in proportion to the size of the network.' 8' The
greater the number of people using a certain software program (i.e., the
greater the size of the network), the less the users must worry about
compatibility issues, and the more proficient these users may become at
operating the software.
Conversely, path dependence, or lock-in, cabins consumer freedom by
establishing a software protocol outside of which the consumer cannot
conveniently work. 82  To expand on the Word-WordPerfect example
above, consider the time required to be proficient in either program and the
imperfect file conversion ability of either program. 83 If Word's market
share grows and displaces WordPerfect's share of the market, consumers
will see increased compatibility between their word processing ventures.
But this increased compatibility comes at a price: consumers will be
dissuaded from using WordPerfect because it is not seamlessly compatible
with Word-the standard word processing program in this hypothetical-
even if WordPerfect is a superior product.
Finally, the software industry, like other intellectual property sectors,
179 Cf Microsoft II, 147 F.3d 935, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that the code shared
between Windows and Internet Explorer was legitimate and value-adding); Microsoft III, 87
F. Supp. 2d 30, 49 (D.D.C. 2000) (disregarding that Windows and Internet Explorer shared
code, and instead focusing on what consumers perceive as "commercial reality"--that the
programs are separate).
180 This Article briefly and selectively outlines these network effects. For a more
thorough treatment of network effects in software, and their relation to antitrust, see Howard
A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1 (2001). For a non-legal perspective, see Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent
Demand for a Communications Service, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974).
181 Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 180, at 7-8.
18 2 Id. at 8-9.
183 File conversion in this context involves opening and editing a document or file in one
program that was created in the other program.
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is characterized by high initial costs in the form of research and design,
coupled by extremely low marginal costs. The marginal cost of a software
license-or sale, depending on your approach to click-through licenses-
includes the almost inconsequential cost of the medium on which the
software is fixed and the packaging which contains that fixation. But the
per-unit cost increase of a software license also includes the significant but
often overlooked cost of product support.
1 84
Nonetheless, when contrasted to traditional, secondary industry-such
as automobile manufacturing-the marginal cost of software is remarkably
low. Such low marginal costs encourage bundling: "[A]s marginal costs
rise, bundling creates an inefficiency because some consumers are forced to
buy the bundle even though they value the components at less than their
production costs."1 85 Thus, if bundling low marginal cost products is not
efficient, it is at least minimally inefficient, as compared to the
inefficiencies associated with a bundle consisting of products with higher
marginal costs.
The detailed operation of the three aspects of the software market
briefly outlined above is not settled. Chicago and Post-Chicago adherents
vary on the extent to which economies of scope, network effects, and
marginal costs affect the software market. But most agree that these aspects
do have a disparate impact on the software market, as compared to
traditional, secondary industry. The proposition that the software industry,
and bundling within that industry, behaves differently than traditional
industry-which served as the basis for antitrust tying jurisprudence-is
well recognized, and sufficient for this Article. 186
B. The International Paradox of Software Bundling
If software markets do not behave like traditional, secondary industry
markets, then why should antitrust law treat them as the same? If antitrust
law was not meant to discourage innovation, then why enact a rule that
gives software manufacturers no guidance on how to create multifunctional
184 While most hardware manufacturers take on this responsibility, it is nonetheless
factored into the bargain for the OS license between the OS manufacturer, such as Microsoft,
and the hardware manufacturer, such as Dell.
185 See Sidak, supra note 22, at 11 (citing Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier
(1999) (Working Paper, on file with the YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION)).
186 See, e.g., id. at 6. Sidak remarks that:
Some of the traditional economic explanations for product bundling more
accurately fit smokestack industries than software. The network effects, low
marginal costs, and rapid technological change in software create rationales for
product integration that are both less familiar and more subtle than the bundling
arguments that courts have previously encountered.
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products without exposing themselves to tying liability? Yet software
manufactures that cater to the international market face both problems. In
the European Union, their bundled products are treated no differently than
hammers and nails; they are subject to the same unforgiving standard.187 In
the United States, however, their products are subject to a yet-to-be-defined
rule of reason. Manufacturers are forced into unaided speculation on what a
court may deem reasonable.
Despite being almost polar opposites, both the E.U. approach and the
U.S. approach stifle innovation within the software industry. The E.U. rule,
which focuses so heavily on consumer perception to determine whether
products are integrated or separate, is inherently backward-looking.188 Like
the Jefferson Parrish consumer demand test, the E.U. approach retards
innovation by prohibiting revolutionary bundles which have not yet
displaced the demand for the previously separate components.
89
Recognizing this problem, the U.S. approach did away with any backward-
looking test in favor of an amorphous rule of reason.' 90 But this standard
lacks guidance and inserts judge or jury into the position of armchair
economist so that they may second-guess business decisions.
A better solution to the catch-22 of consumer demand and
innovation' 9' lies in a more structured and less retrospective rule. By
crafting a standard which anticipates consumer demand while providing
guidance and predictability, the Caldera analysis provided the better rule.'
9 2
In the United States, Caldera's rule dovetails nicely with existing Supreme
Court precedent. 93  Indeed, Caldera's rule is more akin to a focused
exception to per se liability much like the exceptions past. 1
94
Moreover, it provides software manufacturers with an idea of what is
and is not a permissible bundle, instead of speculating as to what a judge or
jury might find to be reasonable, the manufacturer need only ask itself
whether the bundle is a "valid, not insignificant, technological
187 See Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, (unreported, March 24,
2004) (CEC), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/
decisions/37792/en.pdf.
188 See supra Part V.
189 See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 92-93 (voicing concerns over the backward-looking
Consumer Demand test's impact on innovation).
190 See id. at 95.
191 See supra Part II.C.
192 Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1325 (D. Utah 1999) ("[I]f the
evidence shows that a valid, not insignificant, technological improvement has been achieved
by the integration of two products, then in essence a new product has been created, and a
defendant is insulated from [Sherman Act] § I tying liability."). See supra Part II.C.
193 See supra Part II.C.
194 See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
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improvement" over the prior art. 95 Who better than a manufacturer to
anticipate whether its software bundle is a significant improvement, and
therefore permissible? Thus, Caldera's rule would allow developers to
conform their conduct to the law.
At the same time, Caldera's forward-looking rule would resolve the
anti-innovation concerns of the E.U.'s approach and provide much-needed
recognition for the special economic aspects of the software market. As
software development advances, programs become more functional. To
keep these functions manageable and user-friendly, developers merge them
into fewer end products. This process moves toward end products which
are fewer in number, offer more complex functions, and are easier to use.
196
By anticipating consumer demand, this rule would allow this natural
progression of innovative software.
197
VII. CONCLUSION
Neither the current U.S. nor E.U. antitrust approach to software
bundling is ideal. Both retard innovation in the software industry. The
European Union refuses to differentiate between regular products and
intangible, ephemeral software, despite well-recognized economic
differences. Moreover, the European Union refuses to consider future
demand for truly innovative products. Manufacturers are thus forced to
comply with rules that do not contemplate their products. Although the
United States no longer makes this mistake, it provides no guidance to what
is a reasonable, and therefore permissible, software bundle. Software
manufacturers are left to hazard guesses as to which bundles are
permissible: manufacturers erring on the side of caution will not engage in
some innovative and useful bundles for fear of exposure to antitrust
liability.
Caldera advances a better rule, which is both structured and forward-
looking. Thus, it suffers from neither of the faults outlined above and
allows innovative software bundles. These bundles allow manufacturers to
create more simplified products which are also more functional and are vital
to the continued development of the software industry.
195 Caldera, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
196 For instance, spell-checking programs and word processing programs were once
offered independently of each other. The user was required to install both programs and deal
with compatibility issues as best he could. Now, all word processing programs come
integrated with a spell-checking program. Integration is seamless, compatibility issues are
nonexistent, and the consumer benefits by having a simper, more user-friendly program that
also has increased capabilities.
197 See supra Part II.C.
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